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The Second Circuit during the 1977-78 term decided a num-
ber of significant cases comfortably contained within the conven-
tional rubric of "civil procedure." I had intended to comment on
one or more in depth in this commentary, but found myself
preempted by the student comments that follow. Moreover, in
reading over the court's work for a term in search of an overlooked
judicial gem upon which I might hope to add a little polish, and
dipping lightly into the court's statistics in search of inspiration, I
became a born-again convert to the relatively new discipline un-
happily labelled "judicial administration."1 Since all civil cases in-
volve "civil procedure," and criminal cases have a strong impact
upon the process of deciding civil cases, I doubt that I have gone
too far astray from the assigned topic in making a few comments on
that subject.
Many of us have become inured to the constant cries of court
congestion, litigation explosions, and the need to process appeals
efficiently and expeditiously. I never found my libertarian impulses
strongly aroused by the specter of delay, but there is near unanim-
ity that delay in getting to trial and delay in the appellate process
are unmitigated evils.2 The only legitimate question is which is
worse.3 Stem measures have been taken to reduce such delay,
'vith remarkable success, especially in the Second Circuit, which
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1 I was also influenced by Feinberg, ForclCord: Judicial Administration:
Stepchild of the Law, 52 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 187 (1978). "Judicial Administration" is
an unhappy label since it suggests a close relationship with business administration,
conjuring up preoccupation with markets, efficiency, production. output and the like.
It has been contended, however. that many of the concerns ofjudicial administration
are not only different, but also are necessitated by the refusal of courts to submit to
market forces. See R. POSNER, ECONOI.fiC ANALYSIS OF LAw 332-56 (1972). In an}'
event, it is clear that problems of judicial administration overlap in only limited ways
those of running a business.
2 See H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT xxii (l959).
3 But see R. POSNER, supra note I, at 354-55.
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has been formally applauded by the New York, Connecticut, and
Vermont Bar Associations and the deans of the law schools located
in those states, for its admirable record, "unique in the annals of
the federal appellate system" of having disposed of all its business
for five successive years. 4 The Second Circuit's achievements in
that regard do not end there. The median time for disposition of
appeals in the Second Circuit, 5.5 months, is the "best in the na-
tion."5 Several innovations originating in the Second Circuit have
been adopted elsewhere. 6 Regarded by many as the second most
prestigious court in the nation, and by most as the next in impor-
tance, the Second Circuit, under the leadership of Chief Judge
Kaufinan, has maintained that eminence in matters of prompt and
efficient disposition of cases.
These gains, however, have not been won without costs, and
it is those costs that have largely been ignored or underplayed by
the law reviews, by scholars, and by the court itsel£ The observa-
tions that follow are made in the hope of stimulating the applica-
tion of creative energies to assessing those costs and to assisting the
court in making the trade-off's that the constantly climbing inflation
of cases requires.
The Second Circuit, like the other circuits, is, in all but a
miniscule number of cases, the appellate court of first and last re-
sort. 7 It bears a heavy burden to assure the public that the first
level decisions it has jurisdiction to review are not unconnected,
isolated, individual, lawless acts of a judge or a bureaucrat; to per-
suade disappointed litigants that they have been dealt with justly
and according to law. Appellate review is also essential to uniform-
ity and harmony among lower level decision-makers. Without an
appellate court announcing, clarifying, and harmonizing the appli-
cable legal principles within its jurisdiction, primary level decision-
making would be chaotic; the public would be subjected to con-
4 Remarks of Harold R. Tyler, Jr., SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
578 F.2d 1,5 (June 26, 1978).
5 Kaufman, State of the Judicial Business in the Second Circuit, SECOND CIR-
CUIT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Sept. 8, 1978, at 15.
6 Remarks ofJustice Winslow Christian, SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SECOND CIR-
CUIT, supra note 4, at 10, 12; Streich, Job Enrichment for Court Clerks, 59 JUDICA-
TURE 390, 394 (l976); Streich, Speeding Criminal Appeals in the Second Circuit, 58
JUDICATURE 286, 292 (1975).
7 During fiscal 1978, the Second Circuit terminated 1888 cases. ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 44
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 ANNUAL REpORT]. During the same period, 11 writs
of certiorari were granted by the Supreme Court. Id. at A-6 (Table B-2).
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flicting legal commands and predictability would disappear. \Vith it
would go the respect for legal institutions and the principles they
espouse.8 These essential functions of appellate review are in grave
danger, in the Second Circuit and elsewhere. "The federal inter-
mediate appellate system is on the verge of ceasing to function as
an effective administrator ofjustice."9
A few statistics may suggest the dimensions of the problem. In
1966, ninety-seven cases were filed, terminated or pending per ac-
tive judge in the Second Circuit;IO in 1977, the caseload per judge
more than doubled, to 229.11 There were 448 appeals decided in
1968,12 1108 in 1977.13 The number of judges deciding them re-
mained virtually the same. Judge Mansfield, in his 1975 foreword
to the Second Circuit Review, made even more startling compari-
sons of the court's workload with what it was in 1951, the last year
of Chief Judge Learned Hand's tenure. 14
The expanding caseload of the court reflects, of course, the
glut of cases in the district courts, which is the result of the prolif-
eration of federal regulatory and welfare measures, civil rights leg-




















(2) Per Active Judge
Appeals Tenninated
(1) Total
(2) Per Active Judge
Appeals Decided After
Hearing or Submission
(1) Total 268 816 +204%
(2) Per Active Judge 45 91 +103%
Mansfield, Foreword: The Second Circuit Review, 1973-74 Term, 41 BROOIa.\"N L.
REv. 757, 759-60 (1975).
8 See generally K. LLEWELYN, THE CO~IMON L..o\w TRADlTION-DECIDIXC AP-
PEALS (1960); R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVlL CASES (1940).
9 Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Court of
Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257.
1°.ANNuAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT 168 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 ANNUAL REPORT.].
11 Id. In fiscal 1978, the Court terminated 211 cases per judgeship. See Kaufman,
supra note 5, at 15.
12.ANNuAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 103 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 ANNUAL REPORT].
13 1977 .ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 3D!.
14 Judge Mansfield unearthed the follOWing statistics:
1951
6
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of federal criminal jurisdiction, and the increased availability of le-
gal services. IS Judge Friendly has brilliantly, if not always persua-
sively, argued that the principle answer to the congestion of federal
courts lies in the elimination of diversity jurisdiction, the creation
of specialized appellate tribunals, and similar measures,16 but much
movement in that direction seems politically unfeasible. 17
Although the problem has not received the attention it de-
serves from the law reviews, it could not have escaped the judges,
who have been proposing and attempting solutions for decades.
Among the most disturbing responses is the elimination of oral
argument in large numbers of cases. This has not as yet happened
in the Second Circuit, which is the only circuit preserving a rou-
tine right of litigants to present oral argument. 1S Even in the Sec-
ond Circuit, however, the norm for argument is fifteen minutes
per side, hardly enough time to get one's bearings. 19
Only a few decades ago, it would have been branded absurd
to suggest that a federal circuit court, which is in all but form
the only appellate court, could perform its essential functions with-
out delivering a reasoned opinion explaining its decision. 2o Yet a
written opinion is now the exception rather than the rule in the
Second Circuit (and many others). Of the 1026 decisions of the
court in 1977, 554 were without written opinion. 21
It has now become commonplace for a defendant, sentenced
to five or ten years in prison, to be packed away without so much
15 For a discussion of the rapid expansion of federal jurisdiction, see Judd, Ex-
panding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 938 (1974); Comment, Feel-
eralIntervention on State Criminal Proceedings: Inadequate Remedies In AeleqlUlte
Forums, 63 GEO. L.J. 1143 (1975).
16 H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
17 A quarter century ago, Professor Hart asserted that, "[t]he time has long been
overdue for a full dress reexamination by Congress of the usc to which these [fed-
eral] courts are being put." Hart, Relations Between State and Feeleral Law, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 489, 541 (1954).
16 See Haworth, supra note 9, at 265.
19 The practical norm is not the technical mandate of Second Circuit procedural
rules. 2ND CIR. R. 34(d) provides:
The judge scheduled to preside over the panel will pass on requests for
time for argument additional to the 30 minutes generally allowed by Rule
34(b). Upon the basis of a review of the briefs, he may also fix a time for af'
gument less than 30 minutes if he concludes that a smaller amount of time
will be adequate. The clerk will notify counsel of all such rulings.
20 See R. POUND, supra note 8 at 4; but see id. at 36.
21 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE, UNITED STATES COUnTS,
SECOND CIRCUIT 20 (1977).
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as the stroke of an appellate judge's pen.22 A civil litigant who was
bankrupted by a judgment in the district court can find that judg-
ment affirmed without written explanation of the legitimacy of the
district judge's findings. This practice threatens the integrity of the
process not merely because it provides an opportunity to cloak bla-
tant illegality with silence but also because it deprives disappointed
litigants of assurance that their briefs have been read and seriously
considered and that the appellate function has been performed.23
Few, I think, would contend that there has been any corre-
sponding improvement in the full opinions written by the court.
Seldom do they purport to bring fresh insights to vexing problems;
rarely do they reach beyond pirouettes around or claimed adher-
ence to precedents, into the realm of social science or economics,
or even, beyond obvious adornments, to the law reviews. The pre-
vailing tone is one of pronouncement, not reasoned exegesis.
Appellate court congestion creates even more serious threats
to appellate function than the elimination of opinions or the prolif-
eration of unsatisfactory ones. It inevitably produces excessive reli-
ance upon the primary decision-makers, gravely weakening the
corrective function. It also tends strongly to encourage sub silentio
reliance upon the personal values and predilections of the individ-
ual judges, undermining the main object of institutional procedures
of collective, deliberate decisionmaking: to lift the judge out of the
mold ofhis own tastes and values:
Appellate judges are expected to deliberate and then to arrive at
a collegial decision based on the matured thought of each judge
22 See, e.g., United States v. Bruschi, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Fernandez, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978): United States v. Garcia, 582 F.2d 1272
(2d Cir. 1978); United States V. Grant, 582 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1978); United States \'.
Kelly, 582 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Weinstein, 582 F.2d 1272 (2d
Cir.1978).
23 One reason why oral argument has been retained in the Second Circuit is "be-
cause it gives parties their day in court, assuring them that their case has received
careful and complete judicial scrutiny." Kaufman, The Pre·..\rgur1lent Corifercnce: An
Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1095 (1974). That is surel),
an exaggeration of the potential of a 15 minute argument. Moreover, in my experi-
ence, the oral argument has occasionally revealed precisely thl' oppositl', i.e" that at
least one or two members of the panel had given the ease virtually no shldy in ad-
vance of the argument. I do not mean to denigrate the value of oml arnum{'nt. how-
ever brief, but I do not think it generally affords any assumncl' that till' t'US{, has re-
ceived "careful and complete judicial scrutiny." Nor do I ml'an to SUR~{·~t that thl'
judges of the Second Circuit normally come to thl' oral arnum{'nls totall), un-
prepared. They rarely do. But they plainly do not havl' timl' to gin' {'n'l'}' t ...S{·
anything approaching "careful and complete judicial scrutiny."
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participating . . . . [T]he decision is expected to be explained in
tenns that will withstand public inspection. These techniques for
controlling the personal factor require a considerable investment
of time and intellectual energy; as congestion makes these com-
modities scarce, we must expect that judgments will become
more impulsive, less reflective and less impersonal.24
As the judges come more and more to rely on their own personal
values, the utility of opinions is diminished: they reflect rationalizu-
tions, rather than reasons. The second essential appellate function,
unifying and harmonizing the law governing lower tribunals, is
damaged. Predictability suffers, divergent expectations of litigants
are fostered, and more and more appeals are pressed to conclusion.
Congestion begets more congestion.
I join with Judge Feinberg in his recent plea that law reviews
focus more of their efforts in solving these potentially calamitous
problems. 25 The courts need more help than they are getting.
THE DISTRICT COURT CASELOAD
The basic source of the problems, heavy caseloads in the dis-
tricts courts, seems intractable. Even if diversity jurisdiction were
eliminated, this would reduce caseloads by only about 9%.26 Much
of the congestion is caused, moreover, by the increasing invocation
of federal criminal laws.27 One method of containing this increase,
or perhaps cutting back on it, is to limit the number of prosecutors
and ancillary personnel. Another less obvious method is to set
aside on appeal a substantially higher proportion of convictions. 28 If
the circuit courts reversed their present trends and tightened up
on the government's burdens of proof and were more protective of
defendant's rights, fewer prosecutions would be brought, and there
would be fewer appeals. In most circuits, most notably the Second,
the flimsiest of prosecution cases will survive and almost any
24 Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to tlie
Function ofReview and National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 555 (1969).
25 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 194-95.
26 See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON ApPEAL 194
(1976).
27 In fiscal 1977, 41,020 criminal cases were filed in the district courts of the
United States. 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 249. This was an increase of
a third over 1968, when there were 30,714. 1968 ANNUAL REPORT, supra noto 12, at
117.
28 The average reversal rate in all circuits in criminal cases during 1978 was
10.7%. The Second Circuit was lowest, with 6.3%.1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
7, at A-3 (Table B-1).
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prosecutorial short-cut or rule deviation 'viII be buried under the
«harmless error" doctrine.29
On the civil side, current hopes rest mainly on settlement pro-
cedures, although from time to time courts attempt to preclude lit-
igation by restrictive readings ofjUrisdictional statutes or by impos-
ing, where possible, heavy costs.30 A recent experiment, pursuant
to local rule in the districts of Connecticut,31 Eastern Pennsyl-
vania,32 and Northern California,33 is compulsory arbitration. fol-
lowed by a trial de novo if the arbitration award is unsatisfacto-
ry.34 The returns are not yet in on those eX'Periments.
MEASURES AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL
At the appellate level, partial solutions are more promising.
Among the less drastic but most successful measures is the Second
Circuit's «Civil Appeals Management Plan," an important element
of which is a conference presided over by the court's staff counsel
with an eye to producing a settlement.35 As a result of tllis plan.
329 appeals, more than one-fourth of the civil filings, were settled
last year.36
A number of suggestions are made from time to time about
providing disincentives to appeal. A common one is to reduce an
appellant's chances of success by modification of rules concerning
the scope of review,37 but this is a pro tanto abdication of the ap-
pellate function. And it has virtually no prospect of curbing tlle
flow of criminal appeals, since defendants who are indigent have
little, if anything, to lose, and for tllose with money the cost of an
appeal is dwarfed by the magnitude of the stakes. As noted. re-
stricting the scope of review in criminal cases probably increases
the criminal caseload in both the district and the circuit courts.
29 See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970);
Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (1976); Com-
ment, People v. Crimmins: The New Prejudice Rule, 40 ALB. L. REV. 405 (1976).
30 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
31 CONN. R. 28.
32 E.D. PA. R. 49.
33 N.D. CAL. R. 500.
34 There is also a "Voluntary Masters Project" underway in the Southern District
of New York, wherein the "Master," a highly qualified trial lawyer, will "assist the
parties in clarifying and narrowing the issues presented by a dispute." Kaufman, SI/-
pra note 5, at 9.
35 See Kaufman, supra note 23, at 1098.
36 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CmCUlT EXECUTIVE, UNITED STATES COURTS,
SECOND CrnCUlT 19 (1977).
37 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 129.
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My colleague Geoffrey Hazard has put forth as "worth consid-
ering," the proposal that a criminal defendant be given a
disincentive in the form of an increase in his sentence for an
unsuccessful, or perhaps a frivolous, appeal. 38 Assuming, arguendo,
that this could pass constitutional muster, it would make a mockery
of the sentencing process and threaten what little respect is left for
the criminal justice system. A similar but slightly less offensive
idea is to provide a sentence discount for those defendants who
forego an appeal. 39 This proposal would require careful meshing
with the plea bargaining system wherein a defendant already gets a
discount but retains a limited right of appeal. An appropriate "no
appeal" discount for one who pleads guilty might be inappropriate
for one convicted after trial. 40
If and when courts become desperate enough to consider ad-
justing a sentence to deter criminal appeals, they should be ready
to adapt plea bargaining procedures to the appellate process. It
seems anomolous that the courts have put their imprimatur on plea
bargaining, even sentence bargaining, in the district court,41 but
will not even consider employing it at the post-conviction, appel-
late stage. Why shouldn't there be a "Criminal Appeals Manage-
ment Plan"?
Another provocative proposal, applicable only to criminal de-
fendants, is to encourage them to sell their right of appeal. 42 A
fund would be set up by Congress to offer to the indigent defend-
ant convicted of crime an option: he could accept a sum of money
approximating the cost of taking an appeal in lieu of a publicly sup-
ported appeal and collateral attack. This could perhaps be rational-
ized on rehabilitational principles. 43 It would encourage the crimi-
nal defendant, like the civil litigant, seriously to evaluate his
prospects of success. Under one variant of the proposal, a defend-
ant who accepted the money would not be denied an appeal, he
would merely be denied a free one. He could use the award to
38 Hazard, After the Trial Court-The Realities of Al1pellate Review, III TUE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 60, 84 (1965).
39 See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 95.
40 A somewhat similar problem has been noted regarding pending proposals to
make federal sentences more uniform. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform (mel
Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" (md "Presumptive"
Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978).
41 See FED. R. CRIM. P. U(e).
42 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 26, at 93·94.
43 It could also be justified, perhaps, as welfare, on the theory that the tll,fen·
dant's family is needy, especially ifhe is on his way to prison.
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hire his own lawyer and pay for the appeaL44 This seems a desira-
ble way of equalizing the choices of the indigent and the
nonindigent criminal defendant, but it seems unlikely to curtail
many appeals, given the severe sentences commonly meted out in
federal courts. Even to a pauper, a few thousand dollars is a paltry
sum compared to a lengthy prison sentence. Moreover, the right of
appeal is too fundamental to be merchandised like butter and eggs;
the probability of an intelligent, informed decision to sell a right of
appeal would be slight, the bargains would be unenforceable, and
further delay and congestion might be created.
Other ideas for controlling the appellate caseload focus on
penalizing the lawyers. Judge Kaufman would impose ethical obli-
gations on attorneys to be "more responsible [and] more protective
... towards the courts and its business."45 Judge Friendly thinks
that "the courts should not hesitate to refuse or reduce compensa-
tion under the Criminal Justice Act in cases of flagrant abuse," i.e.,
where a lawyer "seeks a reversal to which ke kllOWS his client is
not entitled."46 Presumably, Judge Friendly would support similar
economic sanctions against lawyers on the civil side. Fortunately,
these proposals, despite the eminence of their sponsors, have gath-
ered little support. It is and should remain the client's decision,
not his lawyer's, to pursue an appeal.47 Moreover, given the dete-
rioration in the appellate process already sketched, together with
the virtual elimination of rehearings and en banc proceedings,48 al-
most all appeals have at least some slight chance of success. Much
depends on the luck of the draw-the makeup of the panel chosen
to hear the case. An appeal which might seem meritorious to one
or two judges on one panel could appear wholly frivolous to an-
other. It is bad enough to have substantial rights turn on such
fortuities; the evils should not be compounded by encouraging
judges to punish lawyers whose hopes of success seem in retro-
spect to have been unrealistic.
44 P. CAmuNGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 26. at 93-94.
4S Kaufman, Introduction: The Second Circuit Rer:iew. 1971-72 Tenn. 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. (1973).
46 H. FRIENDLY, supra note 16. at 42.
47 Carrington, supra note 24, at 574-75. For other proposals to penalize lawyers
or litigants for taking frivolous appeals. most of which would seem frivolous were
they not so dangerous, see Note, Disincentiees to Frieolous Appeals: An Eealuation
of an ABA Task Force Proposal, 64 VA. L. REv. 605 (1978).
48 Feinberg, supra note 1, at 188; Note, En Bane hearings in the Federal Courts
of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities. 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563.
564 (1965).
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A related and, in the long run, more promising prospect for
diminishing the flow of appeals is better education of appellate law-
yers. Even though it is the client's decision to appeal, he should be
heavily influenced in reaching that decision by his lawyer's predic-
tions about the prospects of success. If a way can be found to im-
prove the quality of those predictions, the divergent expectations
of litigants can be narrowed and settlements or dismissals pro-
duced. As long as predictive skills remain in short supply, dis-
incentives, dependent upon predictions, will be both ineffective
and unjust.
Recent modifications of the court's rules for admission to
practice, requiring some prior appellate experience,49 may reduce
the incidence of occasional gross incompetence in the presentation
of a case, but they can have no impact on improving lawyers' pre-
dictive powers. It is difficult to imagine what kind of education or
experience would have that potential. 50 Members of the court may
know a "frivolous" appeal when they see it, but they have provided
scant guidance to the bar in developing criteria for judgment. The
paucity of information is exacerbated by the trend to decide with-
out opinion or to write opinions that reveal virtually nothing about
49 2ND CIR. R. 46(a) requires an attorney seeking admission to the bar to have
(1) argued in either State or Federal appellate courts at least three ap-
peals of a substantive nature. The argument of an appeal in a Moot Court
program conducted by a law school recognized by the American Bar Associ-
ation shall be deemed the equivalent of an argument in an appellate court;
(2) observed the argument of two appeals in this Court;
(3) read and [been] familiar with the Federal Rules of Appellate Proct'-
dure and the local rules of this Court; and
(4) in lieu of any of the arguments required by (I) supra, argued two
motions of a substantive nature in which briefs or memoranda of law are
submitted in State Courts, Federal Courts or before administrative tribunals.
so In a recent study, Thomas Marvel interviewed lawyers who had appeals pend-
ing in an unidentified court with discretionary jurisdiction. Apparently, all of the in-
terviews took place after the briefs were filed; "several" followed the oral argument.
Marvel asked these attorneys to predict whether they won or lost. Nearly a third had
"no idea" how the case would be decided. Of those who did, 40% were wrong. In
civil cases, only 60% would venture an opinion, and half of these were incorrect. T.
MARVEL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 66-67 (1978). As the author astutely
recognizes, cases before a tribunal with discretionary jurisdiction are likely to be
closer to call than those before a court which cannot pick its cases. ld. at 67. Still,
the data are disquieting.
Marvel also tried to find correlations between the backgrounds and experionco
of attorneys and the quality of their briefs. He found few. One finding that he did
make was that inexperienced attorneys are "better" than experienced ones. lei. lit 68.
He concludes that "attempts by courts to improve advocacy by regulating the bar lire
almost surely doomed to failure." ld. at 69.
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the dynamics of the process or the real reasons for decision. Seri-
ous progress in this realm cannot be expected until the tools for
prediction are sharpened, relevant data are assembled, analyzed
and disseminated,51 and until court congestion is relieved by other
methods so that institutional pressures tending to produce pre-
dictability can reassert themselves.
INSTITUTIONAL MODIFICATIONS
If little can be done to curtail the caseload, chan~es can be
made in the functions of the circuit courts to help them cope with
their responsibilities. The most drastic, and most debated, proposal
is the creation of a national court of appeals, which would take over
some of the functions neglected by both the circuit courts of ap-
peals and by the Supreme Court. The creation of such a court
would downgrade the prestige and importance of the circuit courts.
It would not lower the circuit courts' caseloads, but would reduce
the impprtance of their decisions. The judges of the Second Circuit
and, surely, most other circuit judges are opposed to it.52 \Vith
such a court, however, the circuits' resort to decision without opin-
ions, the curtailment of oral arguments, and other shortcuts would
become more palatable because the decisions would be less final.
There is surprisingly little support for an alternative which, al-
though contributing little to the felt need for more nationally bind-
ing decisions than the Supreme Court can produce, would enhance
rather than denigrate the prestige and importance of the courts of
appeals, i.e., the introduction of an intermediate appellate court
beneath the circuit courts, similar to the New York or the Cal-
ifornia models.53
Splitting up circuits, often advocated for the Fifth and the
Ninth, would be little help for the Second, since 90% of its busi-
ness comes from New York.54
Nor is increasing the numbers of judges an easy answer. It
tends to diminish the visibility, dignity and prestige of the judges
and thus encourages irresponsible decision-making. It also in-
creases the number of panels and, in geometric proportion, the
51 See text accompanying notes 58-84 infra. See generally COUNSEL ON APPEAL
(Charpentier, 1968).
52 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 49-54; Feinberg, Foreword: A Na-
tional Court ofAppeals?, 42.BROOKLYN L. REv. 611 (1976).
53 For an interesting nod in that general direction, see Hufstedler, New Blocks
for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971).
54 See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 16, at 41.
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combinations of judges who make up the panels, compounding the
difficulties of the judges themselves in understanding their own
court's jurisprudence, diminishing predictability and accountability
and, probably, encouraging more appeals. The collegial process so
essential to effective appellate functioning can be virtually de-
stroyed by too many judges. 55
A less drastic measure than any of the above, but equally
troublesome, is the increased delegation of responsibilites to
clerks, staff counsel, and law clerks.56 I suspect that a good deal
more delegation goes on than the public would like to hear about.
The subject is to some extent shrouded in secrecy. It should not
be. These personnel have grown in numbers roughly equivalent to
the increase in caseloads.57 They surely are kept busy doing some-
thing. If the law schools and the bar are to be helpful to the courts
in making the difficult choices that must be made, more informa-
tion is needed about what these people do and what they might be
doing. I, for one, am not troubled by law clerks, or even stafl'
counsel, drafting opinions or participating in deliberative processes.
Law clerks especially are an invaluable source of new ideas, new
perceptions, new challenges, and they ought to be used for this
purpose. Still, there are limitations, and serious ones, Predict-
ability and accountability both are threatened by delegation of
decision-making input to nonjudicial, temporary employees. Surely
there comes a point at which it would be preferable to add more
judges than to delegate more to nonjudges. I have no idea whether
that point has been reached.
SOME NEGLECTED INQUIRIES
There are some other matters not commonly considered "judi-
cial administration" that are sorely neglected at the level of the cir-
cuit courts. Scholarly studies on these matters could make signifi-
cant contributions not only to problems of caseload management,
but also to the quality of the appellate court's decisions, to an un-
S5 See id. at 44-46; Hazard, supra note 39, at 8D-81.
56 See on staff attorneys, D. MEADOR, ApPELLATE CounTS: STAFF AND PnOCESS
IN THE CRISES OF VOLUME 9, 231-39 (1974); on law clerks, Judicial Clerksliips: A
Symposium on the Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1123 (1973). A related problem Is
the use of visiting judges, drawn, for the most part, from the district courts. In 1977,
18.4% of all case participations in the Second Circuit were by visiting judges. 1977
ANNUAL REpORT, supra note 10, at 177. The pros and cons of that practice alone de-
serve a small book.
57 Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125,
1133-36 (1973).
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derstanding of the dynamics of the process, to increasing account-
ability.
We need books and articles, of which there is a plethora about
the Supreme Court58 and virtually none about the courts of appeals,
describing the inner workings, the day to day operations of the cir-
cuit courts. Who does what? When? Why?
We need studies of the way the courts allocate their time.
How much time do they spend on reading briefs, how much on
opinion writing, how much on conferences? Until we know the an-
swers, we can hardly suggest better allocations of time. 59
Scholars should do studies of the cases disposed of without
opinion. What were the issues raised? How significant were they?
How supported by authority? Until we have them, we can hardly
make generalizations about the kinds of cases that the court deems
meritorious or significant, nor can we make sound judgments about
how well the court is doing its job.60
Single case studies, contrasting the facts of record with those
reported in opinions, would also make significant contributions to-
ward the court's responsibility.61 It is common talk among practi-
tioners in the Second Circuit (and perhaps every other appellate
court) that the court "invents" facts or ignores others in its opin-
ions. Disappointed lawyers, like losing litigants, are not very cred-
ible witnesses. Moreover, their stock in trade is hyperbole. But
there are apparently no neutral monitors interested in checking out
the stories.
We need historical studies, judicial biographies, other infonna-
tion with which to understand the biases of the judges and their
relationships with one another and with district judges. There is,
so far as I know, only one such work on the Second Circuit.62
58 See, e.g., J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE, THE SUPREME COURT IN A.\l£R1CAN
LIFE (1958); J.H. WILKINSON, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW
(1974).
59 See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. RE\'. 84
(1959). See also Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Cascload, 45 COn...ELL L.Q.
401 (1960).
60 See, e.g., Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the
1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1953), and its predecessors.
61 I doubt that the Second Circuit would be as unfazed as the Supreme Court ap-
parently was by a few analyses of its opinions such as was done in Dershowitz &
Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Obsen:atlons on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
62 M. ScmCK, LEARNED HAND's COURT (1970). For an example of such a stud)'
at the Supreme Court level, see W. MURPHY, ELE!>lENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1964).
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Another important inquiry should be why the court writes full
opinions in some cases but not in others. In the 1977-78 term,
when more than half the cases were decided without opinion,63 the
court nonetheless treated us to full, signed opinions on such ques-
tions as whether a shipowner was liable to a longshoreman who
slipped on some grease,64 whether plaintiff was a "real estate bro-
ker" under Connecticut law,65 whether New York's parol evi-
dence rule precludes oral proof of fraud in defense of a breach of
contract claim,66 whether raising the level of a street abutting
plaintiff's property was a "taking,"67 the sufficiency of evidence in a
medical malpractice case,68 the sufficiency of evidence of insurance
fraud and the measure of damages for a fire in a beauty shop, GI)
whether a longshoreman could recover from the shipowner for in-
juries caused by a falling hatch cover,70 whether an oral employ-
ment contract was unenforceable under New York's statute of
frauds,71 whether HEW gave proper weight to a doctor's testimony
concerning permanent disability of a social security claimant,72
whether the complaint of property owners over the grant of a
multiple-dwelling variance in Queens stated a federal claim, 73
whether the shipowner or the stevedore was liable to a longshore-
man who slipped while loading bales of rags,74 whether the ship-
owner can recover over against the stevedore for improperly
stowed cargo,75 and the sufficiency of evidence under Georgia law
to sustain a verdict that an airline caterer was negligent toward a
stewardess in failing to lock down its buffet. 76
63 See note 20 supra.
64 Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978).
65 Marina Management Corp. v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 104 (1978).
66 Centronics Financial Corp. v. El Conquistador Hotel Corp., 573 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1978).
67 O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 573 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1978).
66 Bevenino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1978).
69 C-Suzanne Beauty Salon, Ltd. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 574 F.2cl 106
(2d Cir. 1978).
70 Cox v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbia, S.A., 577 F.2d 798 (2cl Clr.). cert.
denied, 99 St. Ct. 222 (1978).
71 Weisse v. Engelhard Minerals Chemicals Corp., 571 F.2cl1l7 (2d Clr. 1978).
72 Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1978).
73 Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1978).
74 Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka Zvir, 570 F.2cl 449 (2cl Clr.
1978).
75 Master Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Farida, 571 F.2d 131 (2cl Clr. 1978).
76 O'Gee v. Dobbs House, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1978).
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I cannot imagine what "jurisprudential purpose"77 was served
by most of these opinions that would not also have been served by
full opinions on almost any of the 500 or so cases decided without
opinion. I can only speculate about why they, rather than others,
were chosen for such treatment.78
We also need careful and laborious analysis of the court's sta-
tistics. Understanding of the court would be furthered by statistical
analysis of the correlation of case-related variables to outcomes.
There are, of course, limitations on what can be learned from such
studies. We are not surprised to learn in a recent study of state su-
preme courts, for example, that when a court has discretion to take
appeals, its reversal rate is higher than when appeals are of right,79
nor that wealthier parties tend to win,80 that complex cases are re-
versed more frequently than simple ones,81 that criminal defend-
ants lose more often than any other identifiable group,82 that
among criminal defendants, those convicted of victimless crimes
stand the best chance of reversal,83 but it is important to have our
hunches confirmed. Moreover, there was a surprise: no correlation
was found in the study between reversal rates and caseloads.84
I rest with a reiteration: problems of administering appellate
justice are too important to leave to the judges to solve. Besides,
they don't have the time.
77 2ND CIR. R. 0.23 provides:
The demands of an expanding caseload require the court to be ever con-
scious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accordingly, in those
cases in which decision is unanimous and each judge of the panel belie\'es
that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion, dispo-
sition will be made in open court or by summary order.
78 Most, if not all, the opinions cited above seem to fall within the category that
Judge Mansfield thinks ought not to be published. "Confronted with the prospect
that each of his opinions will be published generally, the conscientious judge ...
naturally strives to emulate the quality of reasoning and style that has traditionally
characterized Second Circuit opinions, at least since Learned Hand presided:'
Mansfield, Foreword: The Second Circuit Review, 1973-74 Tenn, 41 BROOKL'\~ L.
REv. 757, 758 (1975). Although in agreement with Judge Mansfield's observations
about the consequences of publication, a different view on the ultimate issue of pub-
lication is argued by P. CAmuNCTON, D. MEADOR & ~1. ROSENBERG, supra note 26,
at35-4L
79 Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervison) Role of State Supreme CouTts, 87
YALE L.J. 1191, 1201 (1978).
80 ld. at 1204.
811d. at 1206.
82 ld. at 1209.
83 ld. at 1210.
84 ld. at 1203.
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